The recent developments in the Levant have once again brought the longstanding and looming conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon into the spotlight.
The implications of a full-out war between Israel and Hezbollah would be significant, not only for the immediate parties involved, but also for the broader regional dynamics. A preemptive strike by Israel could lead to a prolonged conflict with unpredictable consequences for the stability of the region.
The involvement of Iran, a key supporter of Hezbollah, could escalate the conflict beyond Israel and Lebanon, drawing in other regional players. The delicate balance of power in the region could be upended, potentially leading to a wider conflict with far-reaching implications.
It is crucial to consider the strategic interests at play in this conflict. The geopolitical calculations of regional powers, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States, will shape the course of events in the coming days. Understanding the complexities of these relationships and their impact on the broader geopolitical landscape is essential.
At the moment, there are several indications that the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is indeed escalating into a full-out war.
Israel has announced, several times in the past days, that the IDF is fully prepared and ready for an invasion to "restore calm" in northern Israel.
And this is probably also irrespective of the potential dissolving of the Israeli governmental coalition and possible new elections, too. Minister Ganz announced his leaving of the government, and in case of a deal with Hamas, ministers Ben Gvir and Smotrich announced their leaving, and hence the government would need to form itself anew.
Regarding a possible deal with Hamas, stopping the fight in Gaza would free Israeli and perhaps also US logistics capacities to act in Lebanon.
The reality and threats of conflict on the ground won't change much with any of that. Maybe it will be able to postpone such an escalation, but eventually it will happen.
There's also the possibility that Hezbollah will escalate the situation into a full-out war. Even though there are several indications that it will not be in their interest to do so, they know that eventually they will be defeated.
So, in what scenario would Hezbollah launch a war? Either when they get the order to do so from their assumed financiers in Iran or when they see one potential opportunity to inflict that much damage on Israel, they can argue that they "won".
Yet, actually, it is not important who will initiate. There is a high probability that a full-out war with Hezbollah will start, as Israel can't live with the constant threat forever. It needs to weigh carefully the economic damage it will cause now with the constant threat, and accommodation and support for evacuees and internally displaced persons from the border communities, versus an even bigger and more lethal war in the future.
Hezbollah has a huge stockpile of rockets; it is estimated at over 150,000, and it is capable of firing thousands of rockets at Israel every day, reaching every angle inside Israel, and can do so precisely. It recently resulted, according to video footage, in the pinpointed destruction or at least damage to an Iron Dome battery and attacking an IDF compound without even causing an alarm. Hezbollah can do it now, and they will replicate it as much as possible when it becomes a full-out war. This is a development the IDF can't accept, and the longer it waits, the better and the fuller Hezbollah's stockpile will become.
The moment this confrontation becomes a full-scale war, Hezbollah is expected to increase tremendously the frequency and range of its attacks, hitting not only Haifa, but also Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion airport, Jerusalem or Dimona. This will paralyze life in Israel completely for the duration of the war and have hard repercussions on its economy. And probably it will have an even greater impact on the psyche of the people, as it will literally be under fire like it has never been before, and this will shift their self-perception.
Analogous to Gaza, Israel can be expected to bomb the way free for the ground troops first. Yet the terrain is much different in Lebanon than in Gaza. It is full of mountains and valleys, which make it an ideal playground for guerrilla warfare, in which Hezbollah trained for decades. Therefore, an invasion into Lebanon will be very difficult, and the resistance will be fierce. Yet, southern Lebanon is much less densely populated than Gaza.
In the days before an invasion, the air force will probably heavily bombard any position that it sees as an obstacle for the coming ground troops. Then, the ground invasion will follow, and time and politics will tell what war objectives there will be, how long and how complete a job can be done, or whether there will be a premature and temporary ceasefire and, in a few years, another round of war.
Furthermore, Hezbollah infiltration through tunnels that reach inside Israel is within the possibilities of Hezbollah's Radwan commandos. And as Hezbollah is a guerrilla army, one could imagine that they might infiltrate Israel in IDF uniforms, execute their killings, bombings, sabotage, etc., and disappear in the tunnels again. It would be very hard to tackle such operations without knowing the exit nodes of the tunnels.
The tunnel system inside Lebanon is said to be very large and magnitude more sophisticated than the Hamas tunnels in Gaza. Given that Israel is more than seven months into the war in Gaza and still finding new tunnels and destroying them, it can be predicted that destroying the tunnel network in Lebanon will take much more time and resources.
A very relevant question after the war is how a resupply of arms to Hezbollah can be prevented. If the occupation lasts until the Litany River, Hezbollah will simply stockpile longer-range rockets, and some time from then, a new war will break out.
To prevent such a scenario, Israel will have no choice but to have the war objective of completely destroying Hezbollah's military capabilities. This will be very difficult and may even require the occupation of additional Lebanese territory, i.e., the Hezbollah stronghold on the southern outskirts of Beirut and the Baalbek region. Of course, the IDF knows that the further north it goes, the more casualties there will be, the more resources will be needed and the longer the war will take.
This brings us to the duration of the war. The IDF will not have infinite time to operate in Lebanon. A large part of the soldiers are reservists. They are being taken out of the Israeli economy, and hence, time is money. And another component is that the IDF does not have an infinite number of reservists they could call up. One option to increase capacity would be the end of the decade-old dispute over Haredi (ultra-orthodox) exemption from serving.
How will western allies react to such a development, and how will the Arab world? In short, it is to be expected, similarly to how the reactions were with Gaza. The international pressure and even boycotts will increase against Israel, and the Israeli economy will drop immensely as it will be mainly unproductive. Yet, in the end, there will probably be a period of calm as the major threats against Israel will be incapacitated, at least for a while.
Once Hezbollah was defeated, the dynamics of Arab leaders would also be reordered which could open new possibilities. But it must be kept in mind, it will come with a heavy price and lots of casualties. After all - once again - what realistic alternatives are there?
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